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CASENOTE; Krakauer’s Heavy Burden: Balancing Students’ 
Enhanced Right to Privacy Against the Public’s Strong Right to 
Know 
 
Tim Brothwell 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 Students have substantial privacy rights in their student records, 
and a party who seeks the unilateral release of these records has a 
significantly heavy burden to overcome in order to justify disclosure.1 In 
Krakauer v. State ex rel. Christian,2 the Montana Supreme Court was 
presented with the question of whether an out-of-state journalist’s right to 
know sufficiently outweighed the privacy interest of a student in his 
educational records to allow for the unilateral release of the student’s 
confidential student records to the journalist.3 
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In April 2015 journalist Jon Krakauer published a book, Missoula: 
Rape and the Justice System in a College Town.4 This book documented 
instances of alleged sexual misconduct and sexual assaults that had 
occurred on college campuses, primarily at the University of Montana.5 
Before publishing his book, Krakauer filed a request in January 2014 with 
the University of Montana’s Commissioner of Higher Education, Clayton 
Christian, for the release of a certain student’s disciplinary records.6 
Krakauer specifically named the student whose records he sought.7 
Krakauer was particularly interested in determining what had happened 
during the final stages of the investigation into this student’s alleged 
conduct; the student had been found guilty of rape at multiple stages of 
campus proceedings and was ordered expelled from campus, yet he was 
never actually expelled, and he continued to play for the University of 
Montana football team as its star quarterback.8 Krakauer speculated that 
the decision had been overturned when it reached the Commissioner’s 
office, and he wanted the records to verify his conclusion.9  
 The Commissioner refused Krakauer’s request, asserting that both 
the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) 
                                           
1 Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
2 381 P.3d 524 (Mont. 2016). 
3 Id. at 528. 
4 Id. at 526. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 527. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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and Montana Code Annotated § 20–25–515 prevented him from 
complying with the request because the University had a duty to protect 
the privacy interests of the student.10 The Commissioner argued that in this 
instance the only way to comply with state and federal law was by 
completely refusing to release the records because Krakauer had requested 
the student’s records by naming the student and as a result it was not 
possible to adequately protect the student’s privacy interests through 
redaction.11 
In response, Krakauer filed suit in Montana District Court against 
the Commissioner in February 2014, citing his right to know under Article 
II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution.12 Krakauer’s motion for 
summary judgment was successful, and the district court ordered the 
Commissioner to “make available for inspection and/or copying within 21 
days the requested records, with students' names, birthdates, social 
security numbers, and other identifying information redacted.”13 The 
Commissioner appealed.14  
 
III.   MAJORITY HOLDING 
  
The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the district 
court de novo to determine if the statutory and constitutional issues 
presented had been correctly decided.15 The Court reviewed three primary 
issues16: whether Krakauer as an out-of-state resident had standing under 
Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution17; whether FERPA and 
Montana Code Annotated § 20–25–515 prohibited the release of the 
records; and whether Krakauer’s right to know under Article II, Section 9 
of the Montana Constitution outweighed the student’s right to privacy 
under FERPA and Montana law.18  
 
A.   FERPA and Montana Code Annotated § 20–25–515 
  
FERPA is a federal law that prevents educational institutions 
“from having a policy or practice of releasing education records or 
personally identifiable information contained in education records, and 
                                           
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 528. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 The Court briefly addressed a fourth issue: whether the district court erroneously awarded Krakauer 
with attorney’s fees. Id. at 526. Because this opinion ultimately reversed the district court’s prior order 
to release the student’s records to Krakauer, the Supreme Court vacated Krakauer’s award of 
attorney’s fees until the substantive issues were re-determined. 
17 The Court concluded that Krakauer had standing to bring his suit because based on the plain 
language of the Constitution, the right-to-know applies to all “persons,” not just Montana Citizens. Id. 
at 528–29. 
18 Id. at 526. 
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conditions receipt of federal monies on those institutions' compliance with 
its directives.”19 Under FERPA, student’s disciplinary records are 
considered “education records,” and FERPA authorizes the non-
consensual release of student disciplinary records under certain 
conditions.20  
 The Court noted that despite the general rule that FERPA prohibits 
schools from unilaterally releasing students’ education records, there are 
several non-consensual exceptions within the act.21 One of these 
exceptions allows for the release of the final results of a disciplinary 
proceeding “if the institution determines as a result of that disciplinary 
proceeding that the student committed a violation of the institution's rules 
or policies with respect to such crime or offense.”22 However, the Court 
noted that this exception23 only allows for the release of limited portions 
of the student’s disciplinary records.24 The Court concluded that it was 
unable to determine, based on the record, whether the Commissioner had 
found that a violation had occurred.25 The Court remanded to the district 
court to perform an in camera review of the student’s disciplinary record 
to determine if this exception applies.26 
Another exception under FERPA allows for the release of 
personally identifiable information pursuant to any lawfully issued 
subpoena, and the Court found that this additional exception may apply.27 
The Court noted that the district court’s order for the Commissioner to 
release the records to Krakauer was indeed a valid order under FERPA.28 
However, the Court determined that even a valid order can be upheld only 
if the court properly balances the privacy interests of the student against 
the right to know.29 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for an in 
camera review, finding that the district court’s balancing test was 
insufficiently performed.30 
 The Court next looked to Montana law to determine if the student 
had a separate privacy interest under state law. Montana Code Annotated 
§ 20–25–515 provides:  
 
                                           
19 Id. at 529 (see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2013)).  
20 Id. at 530 (see 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(13) & (14) (2012)). 
21 Id. at 531. 
22 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B)).  
23Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) & (C)(i–ii)). 
24 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) & (C)(i–ii)). Specifically, this exception allows for the release 
of “only the name of the student, the violation committed, and any sanction imposed by the institution 
on that student” and additionally “the name of any other student, such as a victim or witness, only with 
the written consent of that student.” 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(C)(i–ii). 
25 Id. at 531. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232d(b)(2)(B)). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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A university or college shall release a student's academic record 
only when requested by the student or by a subpoena issued by a 
court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction. A student's written 
permission must be obtained before the university or college may 
release any other kind of record unless such record shall have been 
subpoenaed by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.31 
 
The Court concluded that the Montana Constitution requires a 
student's right to privacy in his or her records to be balanced against the 
public's right to know and obtain the records.32 This balancing test must 
be properly performed before requested records can be unilaterally 
released pursuant to § 20–25–515 and any applicable judicial exceptions 
under FERPA.33 
 
B.   Krakauer’s Right to Know and the Student’s Right to Privacy 
 
To determine whether the district court had erred in ordering the 
release of the student’s records to Krakauer, the Court considered 
Krakauer’s right to know and the student’s right to privacy.34 The Court 
applied a two-part test35 to strike the balance between these two competing 
interests: “(1) whether the person involved had a subjective or actual 
expectation of privacy, (2) and whether society is willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable.”36  
 While the Court acknowledged that Krakauer had a right to know 
information pertaining to the government’s response to rape culture at the 
University, it ultimately held that the student’s right to privacy was an 
enhanced right to privacy under FERPA and Montana law.37 The Court 
held that the district court should not have found that the student did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.38 The Court 
concluded that the district court had not properly considered the enhanced 
                                           
31 Id. at 532 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 20–25–515 (2015)). 
32 Id. at 532.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 533. 
35 The Court presents this two-part test as the proper balancing test for determining whether the right 
to know outweighs the student’s right to privacy. However, this test is missing the key, third 
component that actually requires the balancing of the two constitutional issues at stake. As written, 
this two-part test would only address whether or not the student has a privacy interest. Immediately 
preceding this statement, the Court correctly states the third requirement of the test, that the Court 
must consider “whether the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public 
disclosure.” Id. at 533 (quoting Associated Press, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue., 4 P.3d 5, 9 (Mont. 
2000)). While the Court ultimately does mention this important third step, it may have missed an 
opportunity to explicitly outline the process for the district court.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 534. 
38 Id. 
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right to privacy under FERPA and Montana law when it performed its 
balancing test.39 
The Court ultimately remanded the case to the district court to 
perform an in camera review of the student’s records and to re-perform 
the balancing test.40 The Court instructed the district court to weigh the 
student’s enhanced privacy interests and to give careful consideration to 
whether the “futility of redaction affects the privacy analysis,” given that 
Krakauer had named the student in his request.41 
 
IV.   JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT 
 
 The dissent agreed with the Court’s conclusion that had the 
Commissioner voluntarily handed over the student’s records it would have 
been a violation of FERPA.42 However, Justice McKinnon disagreed with 
the Court’s decision to remand the case back to the district court to perform 
an in camera review, as she asserted that the Court could have decided the 
issue on its own.43  
 Looking to the applicability of the FERPA exception allowing for 
the unilateral release of the final results of a disciplinary proceeding,44 the 
dissent primarily argued that an in camera review was unnecessary 
because it could be inferred from the record that the student’s prior guilty 
verdicts had clearly been overturned by the Commissioner.45 The dissent 
contended that, given the Court’s ability to infer that there had been no 
violation, the exception clearly did not apply, and an in camera review 
would be “pointless.”46 
Further, the dissent criticized the majority’s decision to remand 
the case for an in camera review because the student’s enhanced right to 
privacy so clearly exceeded the public’s right to know.47 The dissent 
agreed with the majority that under Montana law there is also an enhanced 
right to privacy.48 However, the dissent took this analysis a step further 
and argued that whenever the Court cannot adequately protect a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, records cannot be disclosed.49 The dissent argued 
that the student’s right to privacy is not reduced by the mere publicity of 
                                           
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 535. 
41 Id. at 534. 
42 Id. at 536 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).  
43 Id.  
44 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 538. 
48 Id. at 537; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 20–25–515; MONT. CODE ANN. § 20–25–512; MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 20–25–513. 
49 Id. at 538. 
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the case and the status of the student, which the majority declined to decide 
itself.50 
The dissent also gave substantial weight to the fact that Krakauer 
had requested the student’s records primarily in order to publish 
information about the student in his book.51 The dissent seems to suggest 
that Krakauer’s right to know is not as strong because of his reason for 
requesting the record in the first place: rather than generally requesting 
records in order to comment on the University’s response to rape culture 
on campus, Krakauer appeared to have been largely interested in what 
happened to this particular student so that he could include this 
information in his book.52 
The dissent concluded that because Krakauer had requested the 
student’s records by naming the specific student, it would no longer be 
possible to protect the student’s enhanced right to privacy if the records 
are released. An in camera review would accordingly be unnecessary, 
especially given Krakauer’s purpose in requesting the records.53  
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
 While the dissent makes a compelling argument that it does seem 
highly likely that the student’s conviction was overturned by the 
Commissioner, the majority was correct to avoid reading anything into the 
record that is not there. The majority properly determined that an in 
camera review by the district court is necessary to determine if 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(b)(6)(B) will apply. In the event that the district court finds that 
this FERPA exclusion does not apply, it should find that the student’s 
enhanced right to privacy outweighs the public’s right to know in this 
instance because the student’s enhanced right to privacy cannot possibly 
be protected given that Krakauer named the student in his request. 
 
A.   FERPA and Students’ Enhanced Right to Privacy 
 
 FERPA protects the confidentiality of educational records kept by 
government-funded schools.54 FERPA prohibits educational agencies 
from disclosing “educational records” or “personally identifiable 
information contained therein” without parental consent or court order.55 
Student disciplinary records qualify as “education records” because “they 
directly relate to a student and are kept by that student's university.”56 
                                           
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 539. 
52 Id. at 538–39. 
53 Id.  
54 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; Lynn Daggett, FERPA in the Twenty-First Century: Failure to Effectively 
Regulate Privacy for all Students, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 59, 62 (2008). 
55 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1). 
56 United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 812 (6th. Cir. 2002).  
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Accordingly, the disciplinary records at issue in this case constitute 
“education records” under FERPA, and the Court was correct to conclude 
that the student’s records fall under the purview and protection of FERPA.  
A party seeking disclosure of education records protected by 
FERPA bears “a significantly heavier burden . . . to justify disclosure than 
exists with respect to discovery of other kinds of information, such as 
business records.”57 The legislative purpose behind FERPA is to prevent 
the disclosure of student records, even when a court orders such disclosure, 
unless the court has properly considered the privacy interest of the student. 
In the words of one senator involved, Congress passed FERPA because 
“there [is] clear evidence of frequent, even systematic violations of the 
privacy of students and parents by the schools through the unauthorized 
collection of sensitive personal information and the unauthorized, 
inappropriate release of personal data to various individuals and 
organizations.”58 Drawing on FERPA’s legislative history, in Rios v. Read, 
decided shortly after FERPA’s passage, a federal court noted that “[t]hese 
privacy violations are no less objectionable simply because release of the 
records is obtained pursuant to judicial approval unless, before approval is 
given, the party seeking disclosure is required to demonstrate a genuine 
need for the information that outweighs the privacy interest of the 
students.”59  
 The proposition that a requesting party has a “significantly heavier 
burden,”60 in the words of the court in Rios, to justify its records request 
strongly implies that students have an enhanced privacy interest compared 
to businesses and other people. Given the legislative history of FERPA,61 
the logical conclusion is that the justification for requiring this 
“significantly heavier burden”62 in the first place is the strong privacy 
rights of students under FERPA such that the requesting party has a higher 
burden than it would in most other circumstances. Unlike the Rios court’s 
“significantly heavier burden”63 approach, the Montana Supreme Court 
defined the issue as a student’s “enhanced right to privacy.”64 Despite 
these two different approaches, the result seems identical: a party seeking 
a student’s records must have significantly stronger interests than would 
typically be required to justify the release of other government records.  
This approach in Rios, that the requesting party faces a 
significantly heavier burden to justify its request in students’ records, has 
                                           
57 Rios, 73 F.R.D. at 598.  
58 Id. at 598–99 (citing 121 Cong. Rec. S7975 (daily ed. May 13, 1975)). 
59 Id. at 599 (citing Sen. Rep. No. 93–1026, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 187 (1974)). 
60 Id. at 598. 
61 Id. at 598–99 (citing 121 Cong. Rec. S7975 (daily ed. May 13, 1975)). 
62 Id. at 598. 
63 Id. 
64 Krakauer, 381 P.3d at 533. 
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been adopted by other jurisdictions.65 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court 
is not alone in concluding that the traditional balancing act between the 
right to know and the right to privacy is amplified in the FERPA setting. 
Furthermore, as Justice McKinnon’s dissent notes, Montana law also 
provides students with a strong right to privacy, independent of their 
enhanced right to privacy under FERPA.66 
  Given the legislative purpose behind FERPA and Montana’s own 
amplified right to privacy, the Court was correct to conclude that a 
student’s right to privacy in his or her records is enhanced, something that 
the district court did not consider in reaching its conclusion. The district 
court gave significant weight to the fact that much of the criminal 
component of this case had already been made public, treating its 
consideration of release of the student records nearly as loosely as it would 
have treated the release of ordinary public records. The district court may 
have reached its conclusion that the right to know outweighed the right to 
privacy because it viewed the student’s privacy interests as relatively light 
interests in public records. Thus, a re-balancing of these competing 
constitutional factors needs to be performed, considering the enhanced 
right to privacy. The district court, having reviewed the full factual record 
once before, is in a better position to perform this task than the Supreme 
Court. 
 
B.   Balancing the Right to Know Against the Right to Privacy 
 
 The Montana Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be 
deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations 
of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, 
except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds 
the merits of public disclosure.”67 Krakauer’s principal argument is that 
his right to know, under the Montana Constitution, should allow him 
access to the student’s disciplinary records. As the Court noted, the 
Montana Constitution gives a high priority to the public’s right to know.68 
However, although the right to know is strong, it is not absolute.69  
If the Court determines that a privacy interest is present, it 
performs what is actually a three-part test to determine whether the 
demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public 
disclosure.70 The Court considers: (1) whether the person involved had a 
subjective or actual expectation of privacy; (2) whether society is willing 
                                           
65 See Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Alig-
Mielcarek v. Jackson, 286 F.R.D. 521, 526 (N.D. Ga. 2012).  
66 Krakauer, 381 P.3d at 537 (McKinnon, J., dissenting). 
67 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
68 Krakauer, 381 P.3d at 533 (majority opinion) (citing Lance v. Hagadone Inv. Co., 853 P.2d 1230, 
1239 (Mont. 1993)). 
69 Associated Press, Inc., 4 P.3d at 10.  
70 Krakauer, 381 P.3d at 533 (citing Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Day, 959 P.2d 508, 513 (Mont. 1998)). 
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to recognize that expectation as reasonable71; and (3), if the first two 
prongs are met to demonstrate the existence of a privacy interest, “whether 
the demands of individual privacy exceed the merits of public 
disclosure.”72 
Given this fact-intensive analysis, the Court correctly chose to 
remand this case to the district court to perform the balancing test. 
However, the Court left several important issues untouched that could 
have been considered without performing a full factual analysis. 
The dissent correctly noted that there does not appear to be any 
legal precedent for the assertion that a student has a diminished 
expectation of privacy simply because he is the star quarterback on a 
football team.73 In his response brief, Krakauer argued that, simply 
because the student in this case agreed to abide by the student-athlete 
conduct code, he no longer had a subjective expectation of privacy.74 
Krakauer compared student athletes to public employees, who have a 
reduced expectation of privacy under Montana law.75 Krakauer’s assertion 
is that student athletes, such as the student at issue in this case, have a 
reduced expectation of privacy due to their public status in the 
community.76 If this position were adopted, every student athlete would 
lose her privacy rights under FERPA the moment that she reaches a certain 
level of athletic success. Had FERPA intended such a broad exception, 
one would think Congress would have made this exception itself.  
The Court, however, did not consider Krakauer’s argument. In its 
holding, the Court noted that students have an enhanced right to privacy,77 
but it did not respond to Krakauer’s assertion that this student has a 
reduced expectation of privacy largely due to his status as a star 
quarterback on the football team.78 However, it is important to note that 
the Court did not actually treat this student differently than any other 
student, as evidenced by the very fact that the case was remanded due to 
an improper consideration of the student’s privacy interests.79 Despite this 
inference, the Court should have corrected Krakauer’s erroneous argument 
by explicitly stating that student athletes should be afforded the same 
enhanced right to privacy under FERPA afforded to other students.  
The purpose of FERPA is to protect all students’ right to privacy, 
not just some students’ right to privacy.80 An enormous judicial exception 
                                           
71 Id.  
72 Moe v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 371 P.3d 415, 420 (Mont. 2016) (citing Billings Gazette v. City of 
Billings, 313 P.3d 129, 143 (Mont. 2013)). 
73 Krakauer, 381 P.3d at 538 (McKinnon, J., dissenting). 
74 Appellee’s Response Brief at 44, Krakauer v. State ex rel. Christian, 381 P.3d 524 (Mont. 2016) 
(No. DA 15–0502).    
75 Id. at 45. 
76 Id. 
77 Krakauer, 381 P.3d at 533 (majority opinion). 
78 Id. at 535. 
79 Id.  
80 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1). 
190 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 77 
 
would be created if the Court were to agree with Krakauer81 and hold that 
any student athlete takes on the role of a public figure, automatically 
waiving his or her right to privacy simply by reaching success in his or her 
athletic career. This type of precedent could have far-reaching 
consequences on FERPA’s nationwide applicability, and if an exception 
should be made, it should be made by Congress, not the judiciary.  
Despite the student’s enhanced right to privacy, Krakauer has his 
own strong right in this case—the right to know. Rape culture on 
university campuses around the United States is a pervasive and wide-
spread issue that affects millions of students.82 It is estimated that as many 
as one in four women will be sexually assaulted at some time during their 
collegiate career.83 The public’s right to know how the University is 
responding to wide-spread complaints of sexual assault is undeniably 
strong, as it affects the entire University community and beyond. Having 
written a book addressing this specific issue, Krakauer has a clear right to 
gather this information from the University. 
Considering the constitutional right to know, the Court has held 
that a requesting party must be provided with “access to the widest breadth 
of information possible, tempered only by the privacy rights of those 
identified in the investigative materials.”84 The first clause of this quote 
arguably stands for the proposition that Krakauer should be entitled to 
receive the records of his choice under his right to know—not just general, 
redacted records from the Commissioner, as the dissent recommended.85 
However, the second part of the sentence restricts the right to know, noting 
that access is not unfettered but in fact limited “by the privacy rights of 
those identified in the records.” The right to know is strong and 
information should ordinarily be delivered according to the manner in 
which it was requested. Even so, the right to privacy may ultimately trump 
the right to know, limiting not only whether the information gets released 
but how much of the information gets released. 
Although Krakauer would ordinarily be entitled to receive the 
“widest breadth of information possible,” FERPA mandates redaction of 
identifying information. If anonymity were truly possible, the release of 
redacted records would have been a fair compromise between the student’s 
enhanced right to privacy and Krakauer’s journalistic right to know and 
inform the public. As the dissent noted, reading between the lines of the 
record, the requested records would most likely have contained enough 
information for Krakauer to determine that an anonymous student was 
                                           
81 Appellee’s Response Brief at 44–45, Krakauer v. State ex rel. Christian, 381 P.3d 524 (Mont. 2016) 
(No. DA 15–0502).  
82 See Terry Steinberg, Rape of College Campuses: Reform Through Title IX, 18 J.C. & U.L. 39, 42 
(1991).  
83 Id. 
84 Lincoln Cnty. Comm’r v. Nixon, 968 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Mont. 1998) (citing Allstate Ins. Co v. City 
of Billings, 780 P.2d 186, 189 (Mont. 1989)). 
85 Krakauer, 381 P.3d at 538–39 (McKinnon, J., dissenting). 
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convicted at various levels of campus proceedings, only to have his 
sentence overturned by the Commissioner. Alternatively, Krakauer may 
have found that a student was found responsible by the Commissioner but 
given virtually no penalty for rape, an equally controversial result. Even 
without the student’s name, Krakauer could have revealed to the public 
how the University handled an incident involving sexual assault at 
multiple stages of campus proceedings.  
Unfortunately, because Krakauer made his request by naming the 
student, the records cannot be released without invading the student’s 
enhanced right to privacy. The release of even redacted records should not 
be allowed at this point because it would be obvious whose records they 
are. Unless 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) applies, this student’s right to 
privacy trumps Krakauer’s right to know private information about the 
student, as opposed to learning how the University addresses rape on 
campus in general. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
Given the unique issues in this case, the Court was correct to 
remand the case to the district court to perform an in camera review to 
decide whether 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) applies. In considering the 
exception, the district court must determine whether or not the 
Commissioner found that the student had violated the University’s rules 
or policies regarding crimes of violence.86 If the Court were to find that a 
violation had occurred, and the student had not been punished via 
expulsion and removal from the football team, the plain language of the 
statute makes it clear that at that point the school would not be prohibited 
from releasing certain portions of the student’s disciplinary records under 
FERPA.87  
However, as noted above,88 it is crucial to note that what 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(b)(6)(C) allows to be released is actually very limited. Under § 
1232g(b)(6)(C), the University would only be permitted to release “the 
name of the student, the violation committed, and any sanction imposed 
by the institution on that student.”89 Thus, even if this exception applies, 
Krakauer would likely not receive the information he seeks: why the 
convictions were overturned.  
On remand, the district court should re-balance the competing 
constitutional interests, considering the student’s enhanced right to 
privacy, to determine what if any records should be released. Absent the 
applicability of 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B), the court should determine 
that the student’s enhanced right to privacy outweighs Krakauer’s right to 
                                           
86 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B). 
87 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) & (C). 
88 See supra note 24. 
89 Id. 
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know in this instance. The judiciary should not create an exception to 
FERPA for all student athletes, and Krakauer has requested the student’s 
records by name, amplifying the need to protect the records. If the court 
finds that 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) does apply, it will still need to 
balance the right to privacy against the right to know because the exception 
does not mandate release of the records. The exception allows release 
under FERPA, but it does not affect analysis under Montana Code 
Annotated § 20–25–515 or under the individual right to privacy 
guaranteed by the Montana Constitution.90 Thus, under Montana privacy 
law, if the FERPA exception did apply, it would still be just one more 
important factor for the court to consider in balancing the right to privacy 
against the right to know. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
90 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. Although the Court did not explicitly explain this in its discussion of 
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (see Krakauer, 381 P.3d 524, 537), it is crucial to note that the right-to-
privacy guaranteed by the Montana Constitution under art. II, § 10 provides greater privacy protection 
than the U.S. Constitution. State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d 144, 148 (Mont. 2009) (citing State v. Burns, 830 
P.2d 1318, 1320 (Mont. 1992)). This enhanced right to privacy under the Montana Constitution has 
typically been considered in a 4th amendment search-and-seizure setting. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 
175 P.3d 885, 888 (Mont. 2007). However, it has also been considered in other settings, such as in 
considering a woman’s right to an abortion. See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 375 (Mont. 1999). 
In Armstrong, the Court again noted that “[n]othwithstanding, and independently of the federal 
constitution, where the right of individual privacy is implicated, Montana’s Constitution affords 
significantly broader protection than does the federal constitution.” Id. (citing Gryczan v. State, 942 
P.2d. 112, 121 (Mont. 1997). This is further supportive of the assertion that a student has an enhanced 
right-to-privacy in their student records under Montana constitutional law. 
